# Game theory

Monday, October 19, 2015 - 10:15am - 11:05am

Bruce Hajek (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

This talk will focus on theory and practice of combinatorial auctions and their application to the

sale of wireless spectrum licenses. As new wireless applications emerge worldwide, the wireless industry and government regulators are looking to reallocate wireless spectrum to better match the demand. Combinatorial auctions can play an effective role in the allocation process, but important implementation and theoretical issues remain. The talk will include an overview of recent research on the use of profit sharing contracts and core projecting auctions.

sale of wireless spectrum licenses. As new wireless applications emerge worldwide, the wireless industry and government regulators are looking to reallocate wireless spectrum to better match the demand. Combinatorial auctions can play an effective role in the allocation process, but important implementation and theoretical issues remain. The talk will include an overview of recent research on the use of profit sharing contracts and core projecting auctions.

Wednesday, October 21, 2015 - 9:00am - 9:50am

Jeff Shamma (King Abdullah University of Science & Technology)

In coevolutionary networks, the network topology evolves in feedback with dynamical processes on the network nodes. Nodes have state variables that react to the network topology, and the network topology in turn reacts to the nodal state variables. Oftentimes there is a timescale separation, which simplifies the analysis of such systems. A more complicated setting is where the change in network topology occurs at a comparable time scale to nodal dynamics.

Tuesday, November 13, 2012 - 2:40pm - 3:20pm

Diogo Gomes (Instituto Superior Tecnico)

In this talk we will discuss a number of techniques to establish existence of smooth solutions of a class of mean-field games which have a variational structure.

We start by showing that a number of mean-field games with local dependence on the

player's density can be regarded as Euler-Lagrange equations for certain

functionals. These functionals are convex but in a large number of important

examples are not coercive. We will then discuss a number of techniques to

establish a-priori estimates which when coupled with continuation

We start by showing that a number of mean-field games with local dependence on the

player's density can be regarded as Euler-Lagrange equations for certain

functionals. These functionals are convex but in a large number of important

examples are not coercive. We will then discuss a number of techniques to

establish a-priori estimates which when coupled with continuation

Tuesday, November 13, 2012 - 2:00pm - 2:40pm

Alessio Porretta (Seconda Università di Roma Tor Vergata)

We discuss the long time average of Mean Field Games systems as the time horizon tends to infinity and the convergence towards a stationary ergodic mean field game, both in case of local and nonlocal coupling in the cost functional.

Tuesday, November 13, 2012 - 11:20am - 12:20pm

Benjamin Moll (Princeton University)

Mean field games are everywhere in economics. Why? Because heterogeneity is everywhere. For example, macroeconomists often use heterogeneous agent models to understand the interactions between income and wealth distribution and aggregates like GDP. Classic examples are papers by Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998). But the mathematical structure of these models is not well understood and numerical solution often resorts to somewhat awkward approximation techniques.